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ABSTRACT
In 1988, the Washington Legislature classified
intentionally exposing individuals to the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) as criminal assault in the
first degree. Lawmakers intended to penalize infected
individuals without conditioning criminal liability on actual
HIV transmission. Since 1988, however, medical
technologies and effective HIV treatment have rapidly
advanced. Recent studies indicate that effective
antiretroviral therapy (ART) can reduce HIV transmission
risks to a virtual impossibility during moments of
intentional exposure.
Despite these medical advances, the 1988 exposure law
remains unchanged. Consequently, individuals undergoing
effective ART risk felony liability within the course of
commonplace work conduct by intentionally exposing
others to a virtually impossible chance of HIV
transmission. This Article will begin by reviewing how
outdated legislation and judicial precedent impact HIVpositive people, as well as the employers and employees
implicated as victims under criminal exposure laws, by
highlighting the stark contrast between the law and the
*
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technological advances in HIV treatment. The Article will
then consider ways in which state legislatures and legal
practitioners can simultaneously encourage responsible
HIV treatment while honoring the utilitarian justifications
underpinning criminal exposure laws.
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INTRODUCTION
HIV-positive individuals frequently risk felony liability by
engaging in commonplace work conduct that poses a theoretical
risk of HIV exposure. Since one manner of HIV transmission is
“through direct, skin-penetrating blood exposure (e.g., needle-stick
injuries, needle sharing, and transfusions)[,]” 1 employment tasks
prone to expose blood put infected employees in liability limbo.
Two Washington cases, State v. Stark2 and State v. Whitfield,3
1

Gunter Rieg, HIV Infection and AIDS, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR PRIMARY CARE 99, 102 (Anita L. Nelson &
JoAnn Voodward eds., 2006).
2
66 Wash. App. 423, 823 P.3d 109 (1992).
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outline the elements required to charge an HIV-positive individual
with first-degree assault based upon HIV exposure. First, the
infected person must intentionally engage in an act capable of
exposing another to HIV; second, that person must actually engage
in the exposure-prone act. 4 Neither case, nor similar cases from
other jurisdictions, identifies a limiting principle to mitigate
exposure risk via safety precautions, disclosure, consent, or
transmissibility risk. This per se criminal liability creates an
anachronistic criminal liability scheme for infected employees,
colleagues, clients, and employers.
I. HIV EXPOSURE UNDER WASHINGTON LAW
Since 1988, the Washington legislature has criminalized
intentionally exposing another to HIV. 5 The law does not consider
the actual likelihood of HIV transmission during common
exposure-prone incidents. Under Washington’s first-degree assault
statute, criminal liability attaches when an HIV-positive individual
“[a]dministers, exposes, or transmits to or causes to be taken by
another. . . the human immunodeficiency virus. . . .” 6 Although the
criminal actor must act “with intent to inflict great bodily harm[,]”7
this mens rea requirement does not demand intentionally exposing
another to HIV. 8
The penal statutes criminalizing HIV exposure were reactions
to two 1987 news stories that elicited nationwide HIV fear. First,
the blood industry failed to screen for HIV infections in blood
supplies, resulting in HIV infections from blood transfusions. 9
3

132 Wash. App. 878, 134 P.3d 1203 (2006).
See Stark, 66 Wash. App. at 427 n.1, 823 P.3d at 112; Whitfield, 132
Wash. App. at 896, 134 P.3d at 1214.
5
See Wash. F.B. Rep., S.B. 5044, 1997 Reg. Sess. (reclassifying HIV
exposure as a first-degree, rather than second-degree, criminal assault); see also
Act of Mar. 07, 1988, ch. 266, Wash. 1988 Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.021) (classifying “expos[ure] or transmi[ssion of]
human immunodeficiency virus” as second-degree assault).
6
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.011(1)(b) (1997).
7
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.011(1) (1997).
8
See State v. Hahn, 174 Wash. 2d 126, 129, 271 P.3d 892, 893 (2012).
9
Cf. Randy Shilts, And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the
4
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Second, Gaetan Dugas, an HIV-positive flight attendant,
intentionally infected thousands of homosexual men. Mainstream
media soon referred to Dugas as “Patient Zero,” the primary HIV
infector in many early United States HIV/AIDS cases. 10
Proponents of criminal HIV exposure laws justify penalizing
this intentional exposure-prone act, rather than intentional HIV
exposure-transmission, for two reasons. First, the law deters
overall HIV transmission by characterizing exposure, not
transmission, as the criminal act. Second, criminal prosecution
incapacitates the HIV-positive individuals most likely to
intentionally expose others. Consequently, the criminal justice
system progressively eliminates future HIV transmission
incidents. 11
II. EARLY EXPOSURE LAWS: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
The first court to interpret Washington’s 1988 criminal
exposure law held that intentionally exposing sexual partners to
HIV, even without the explicit intent to transmit HIV, constituted
second-degree assault. 12 In Stark, the accused learned he was HIVpositive and received multiple counseling sessions about high-risk
exposure activities. 13 Despite his diagnosis and counseling
advisement, the defendant engaged in unprotected sexual
intercourse with three victims. 14 The defendant failed to disclose
his HIV status to the victims, and expressed disregard for his HIVpositive status to a third party, saying, “I don’t care. If I’m going
to die, everybody’s going to die.” 15
Upholding his conviction, the Washington Court of Appeals
noted that the legislature determined that HIV exposure
AIDS Epidemic 190, 220–23 (1st ed. 2000) (chronicling the discovery of AIDS
in the national blood supply and the subsequent lack of federal intervention).
10
Id. at 11, 21–24; Susan Bolotin, Slash, Burn, and Poison, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1997, at 8.
11
See Zita Lazzarini, Sarah Bray & Scott Burris, Evaluating the Impact of
Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 239 (2002).
12
State v. Stark, 66 Wash. App. 423, 832 P.2d 109 (1992).
13
Id. at 426–27.
14
Id. at 427–28.
15
Id. at 428.
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“constitute[s] a serious and sometimes fatal threat to the public and
individual health and welfare of the people. . . .” 16 Since the
defendant knew he was HIV-positive and intentionally engaged in
unsafe sex practices, he “was not forced to guess at what conduct
was criminal.” 17 The court held that Mr. Stark knowingly exposed
others to HIV within the meaning of the second-degree assault
statute. 18
Stark provides important judicial precedent regarding presentday HIV exposure criminalization. The Stark court established the
required mens rea for HIV exposure: knowingly committing an act
capable of exposing another to HIV. 19 Furthermore, the accused
need not intend to transmit HIV in order to commit assault;
intentional exposure suffices. 20
After Stark, the Washington Legislature revised its criminal
code in order to classify HIV exposure as a first-degree assault
felony. This revision was prompted, in part, by a legislative
concern that “serial murderers. . .avoid full justice because the
[second-degree assault] law is not designed for ‘delayed murder’
as occurs when a person intentionally spreads the human
immunodeficiency virus.” 21
Employing the mens rea standards articulated in Stark, the
Washington Court of Appeals upheld a first-degree assault
conviction in State v. Whitfield. 22 In Whitfield, the appellant knew
he was HIV positive, but rarely practiced safe sex during more
than 1,000 sexual liaisons following his diagnosis. 23 Consequently,
he transmitted HIV to at least five of his 17 sexual partners. 24
Whitfield challenged his first-degree assault conviction for HIV
exposure on statutory preemption grounds, claiming that
Washington’s public health chapter, RCW 70.24, specifically
regulated HIV exposure activity while the first-degree assault
16

Id. at 431 (quoting RCW 70.24.015).
Id. at 435.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 43–33.
20
Id.
21
WASH. S.B. REP. 55-5044, 1st Sess. (1997).
22
132 Wash. App. 878, 134 P.3d 1203 (2006).
23
Id. at 883.
24
Id. at 884.
17
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statute criminalized general HIV exposure. 25 The public health
chapter, Whitfield contended, preempted the assault statute due to
the former statute’s specific applicability. 26
The Washington Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s
contention that based upon the permissibility of per se HIV
exposure determined in State v. Stark, an HIV-positive individual
can violate a public health statute “without intending to inflict
great bodily harm.” 27 Intentionally exposing another to HIV
satisfies the mens rea for first-degree assault prosecution under
Stark, which resulted in the failure of the appellant’s preemption
argument. 28
Like that of Stark, the Whitfield holding affects many HIVpositive individuals who work in conditions that are prone to
exposure—that is, HIV-positive individuals working under
conditions conducive to sustaining open wounds. 29 The Whitfield
court determined that HIV exposure without transmission does not
bar prosecution under Washington’s first-degree assault statute. 30
Washington courts base exposure culpability solely upon the
accused’s actions, regardless of consent, disclosure, safety
precautions, or exposure of another HIV-positive individual to
HIV. 31
Ultimately, Stark and Whitfield established prosecutorial
standards requiring lower Washington courts to treat HIV exposure
as a per se offense that prioritizes “preventative” criminal
prosecution for the sake of general public health.

25

Whitfield, 132 Wash. App. at 888–89.
Id.
27
Id. at 888–90.
28
Id.
29
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV Transmission,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/transmission.htm (last modified Mar. 25,
2010).
30
Whitfield, 132 Wash. App. at 890–91.
31
Id.
26
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III. CONTEMPORARY HIV TREATMENT AND MAINTENANCE
TECHNOLOGY
Reviewing the justifications for criminal HIV exposure laws
reflects a reactionary, rather than reasonable, basis for
criminalizing HIV exposure. The fear of, and potential for,
increased HIV transmission in the 1980s prompted
uncompromising penalties capable of preventing transmission.
Since criminalizing HIV transmission would only be effective on
an ad hoc basis, subsequent to actual transmission, lawmakers
focused on criminalizing exposure risks.
The justifications for criminalizing HIV exposure reflect
the nationwide panic and misinformation about HIV in the 1980s
and early 1990s, when many state legislatures enacted criminal
exposure laws. Many people believed that HIV was “invariably
fatal.” 32 And many associated the virus with social deviance and a
criminal lifestyle, as homosexuals, intravenous drug users, and sex
workers disproportionately acquired HIV in the late 1980s. 33
Initial antiretroviral therapy for the perilous infection were
narrowly effective; preliminary ART options became less effective
as the virus adapted to popular antiretroviral prescriptions,
resulting in increasingly resistant strains of HIV. 34
The difficulties presented by preliminary HIV treatment
instigated medical treatment efforts that, nearly three decades after
the mainstream debut of rampant HIV infection, now enable an
infected person to reduce transmission risk to a virtual
impossibility. 35 HIV transmission risks are substantially affected
by an individual’s viral load, the amount of the virus present in an
infected individual’s blood. 36 A high viral load count indicates a
32

Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor’s World; Promise and Peril of New
Drugs for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, at F1.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g., Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J.
1517, 1524 (2012).
35
Pietro Vernazza, Bernard Hirchel, Enos Bernasoni & Markus Flepp, Les
personnes séropositives ne souffrant d’aucune autre MST et suivant un
traitement antiretroviral efficace ne transmettent pas le VIH par voie sexuelle,
89 BULLETIN DES MÉDICINS SUISSES 165, 165–69 (2008) (Switz.).
36
Id.
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large quantity of HIV per unit of bodily fluid. 37 The line between
HIV exposure and HIV transmission is, thus, determined by
relativity and degree; the greater the viral load, the more HIV an
uninfected person is exposed to, which renders the likelihood of
transmission greater.
Contemporary ART treatment, unlike treatment from the
1980s and early 1990s, significantly decreases viral load counts. 38
When a viral load reaches an “undetectable” level, less than 40
copies of HIV ribonucleic acid (RNA) per milliliter of blood, the
HIV virus is not actively reproducing. In other words, an
undetectable viral load indicates static, almost benign, HIV
infection. Continuous ART sustains an undetectable viral load. 39
Undetectable viral loads mean that an individual’s HIV status
presents an exceptionally low risk of disease progression and, more
importantly, a low transmission risk during moments of HIV
exposure. 40
Recent studies about the relationship between an undetectable
viral load and transmission risks during exposure suggest that an
HIV-positive person on effective antiretroviral therapy with
completely suppressed viremia, determined by an undetectable
viral load, cannot transmit HIV. 41 Specifically, an undetectable
viral load renders the chances of HIV transmission a “statistical
impossibility.” 42
Moreover:
A viral load of <400 copies/mL yields an HIV
transmission risk of .16% during a high-risk
exposure act such as unprotected anal sex with an
uninfected partner. At < 1500 copies/mL, this viral
37

Id.
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Exceptions: The Criminal Law’s Illogical
Approach to HIV-related Aggravated Assaults, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 550,
558 (2011).
39
See Vernazza, supra note 34, at 165–69.
40
See Thomas C. Quinn, et al., Viral Load and Heterosexual Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 921, 927
(2000).
41
“Viremia” is a microbiology term of art that denotes a virus entering the
bloodstream.
42
See Quinn et al., supra note 40, at 926–27.
38
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load has not been proven as a transmittable viral
load variable, indicating that viral loads < 1500
copies/mL cannot transmit the virus during any
exposure period. 43
Emerging medical research indicates, notwithstanding the
inability to demonstrate a scientific impossibility, that undetectable
viral loads render the risk of transmitting HIV during any exposure
period as approximately 1 in 1 million.44 Yet, an HIV-positive
individual commits a felony under the criminal exposure law when
he or she theoretically exposes another to HIV, regardless of
whether the actual transmission risk is 1 in 1 million or virtually
impossible.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW TREATMENT OF HIV
EXPOSURE
The manner in which civil litigation and criminal prosecution
for HIV exposure developed in response to increasing HIV
transmission rates illuminates the overbroad nature of criminal
exposure laws.
In stark contrast to the reactionary criminal law response to
HIV, early civil suits against HIV-positive individuals involved
treating HIV exposure and transmission as a tortious injury. For
example, in Doe v. Johnson, a female plaintiff and her infant child
brought battery and negligence actions against defendant HIVpositive basketball star Earvin “Magic” Johnson following
multiple unprotected sexual encounters. 45 Though Johnson did not
know he was HIV-positive at the time of these encounters, the
plaintiff ultimately prevailed in bringing her civil claims because
Johnson knew or should have known with “substantial certainty”
that he was infected based upon his active and “promiscuous”
sexual lifestyle. 46
43

Attia, et al., supra note 37 at 1397–1400; see also Quinn et al., supra note
40 at 921.
44
See Waldman, supra note 37 at 554–56.
45
Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1383–86 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
46
Id. at 1386–87 (finding in favor of plaintiff against Johnson’s motion to
dismiss).
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The Johnson court, and other courts addressing similar civil
claims for HIV transmission or exposure, utilized foreseeability
standards and a nuanced criterion for civil liability to assess likely
harm resulting from HIV exposure, including individual
knowledge based upon: (1) an affirmative HIV-positive diagnosis;
(2) specific knowledge of particular facts indicating likely
infection, such as exhibiting HIV symptoms or engaging in highrisk contact with an HIV-positive individual; or (3) regularly
engaging in high-risk contact that may result in HIV exposure. 47
Differences between criminal HIV exposure laws, which prioritize
per se and theoretical exposure as dangers necessitating criminal
penalty, and the civil case law demonstrate a disregard for
mitigating factors such as viral load, degree of risk associated with
different modes of HIV exposure, disclosure, consent, and
precautionary safety measures under the penal scheme.
V. APPLYING CRIMINAL EXPOSURE LAWS TO THE WORKPLACE
When theoretical HIV exposure suffices as the actus reus
requirement under criminal law, many HIV-positive individuals
risk committing a felony within the workplace. Those who are
particularly at risk include HIV-infected healthcare practitioners
who engage in exposure-prone actions such as performing invasive
surgeries; drawing blood; or even performing minor procedures
like stitching wounds or resetting fractured bones. Social workers
with HIV who commonly engage at-risk communities with
disproportionately higher HIV infection rates also face possible
liability, since common interactions for social workers include
conflict de-escalation involving weaponry, drug addition
interventions involving dirty needles, and emergency health care
for open wounds. Tactile and physical laborers, such as those
working with machinery or in logging and fishing frequently
jeopardize their physical health due to dangerous tools and job
tasks necessary for job performance. Teachers and public
administrators have responsibility for children and young adults
that may require immediate medical treatment involving open
47

Id. at 1388–89.
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wounds. Professional and amateur athletes are commonly placed
into physically damaging situations in which open wounds and
bodily fluids may be exposed.
Applying overbroad criminal exposure statutes without respect
or consideration for mitigating factors like actual transmissibility
risk, safety precautions, disclosure, and consent renders
responsible HIV-positive employees in these and other fields just
as culpable and liable as an HIV-positive individual who engages
in unprotected sex intending to infect his or her sexual partner.
VI. BALANCING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS WITH CRIMINAL
AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE
In 1998 the United States Supreme Court classified
asymptomatic HIV-positive status as a disability within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 48 As a
result of this classification, legal action against HIV-positive
employees must be based upon a “direct threat” within the
meaning of the ADA. 49 A direct threat is a “significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation.” 50 HIV risk assessment must be based on medical
or other objective evidence; belief in a significant risk, even if
maintained in good faith, does not relieve an employer from
discriminatory liability. 51
Disability classification under the ADA suggests that HIVpositive individuals pose no risk of harm or detriment to workplace
conduct, further undermining the rationality of criminal liability. 52
This Article is not intended to suggest that state legislatures should
adopt ADA standards to provide a mitigating mechanism against
overbroad exposure laws; combatting overbroad criminal liability
by labeling HIV status as a disability will undoubtedly reinforce
48

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1998).
Id.
50
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2009).
51
School Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–86 (1987).
52
See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641–42 (discussing improper grounds for
employment termination based on HIV-positive status posing a general exposure
threat under the ADA).
49
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social stigmatizations already plaguing infected individuals.53
Rather, reference to legislative schemes other than criminal
exposure laws demonstrates an imperative sensitivity and respect
toward HIV infection as an individualized condition, not a
presumptively fatal disease transmissible at every moment of
exposure.
The ADA’s treatment of HIV-positive individuals reveals that
criminal laws should be reformed. The ADA’s direct threat
standard, coupled with an undetectable viral load and common
health precautions, shows that HIV status is a protected
classification based upon a medical condition irrelevant to
workplace safety. 54 In other words, outdated concerns that an
individual’s HIV-positive status always poses a risk of infection
cannot, alone, justify infringing upon an infected employee’s
privacy rights. Yet, an HIV-positive individual simultaneously
poses negligible workplace risk and, by virtue of theoretically
exposing fellow employees and clients to HIV, a transmission risk
justifying felony liability.
Moreover, HIV-positive individuals employed to provide
special needs through safety-sensitive tasks (e.g., health
practitioners, social workers, public educators) might paradoxically
advance public health interests by maintaining regular
antiretroviral therapy (ART) and an undetectable viral load.
Criminal exposure laws applied to workplace conduct, thus,
potentially undermine public health interests in providing effective
treatment by deterring responsible HIV treatment. So long as HIV
exposure is defined through theoretical acts rather than
individualized risk, HIV-positive individuals do not reap legal
benefits from responsible ART. Once infected, an HIV-positive
person remains forever criminally liable for any workplace conduct
the courts deem theoretically exposure-prone.

53

See Doe v. Chand, 781 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624; Suzanna Attia, et al., Sexual
Transmission of HIV According to Viral Load and Antiretroviral Therapy:
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 23 AIDS 1397, 1401–02 (2009).
54
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VII. SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL STIGMATIZATION OF HIV-POSITIVE
INDIVIDUALS BEYOND THE WORKPLACE
HIV-positive individuals in the workplace must worry about
more than the criminal exposure laws that render any exposureprone act an effective felony sentence. The social and professional
repercussions of a publicly known HIV infection adversely impact
an HIV-positive individual’s livelihood, which compounds the
repercussions of criminal liability under exposure laws. Publicly
acknowledging HIV-positive status frequently results in workplace
and social stigmatization by creating the assumption that the
individual is affiliated with socially deviant behavior such as
promiscuous sex, unsafe sex practices, and intravenous drug
usage. 55
Many jurisdictions have acknowledged the aggregate
stigmatization attending HIV-positive individuals. In Doe v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 56 a former employee
brought a civil action against his employer and supervisor for
violating his right to privacy. The respondents learned about the
petitioner’s HIV status through numerous employee health
program purchases. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that the privacy interest vested in information regarding one’s HIV
status is particularly strong because of the stigma, potential for
harassment, and “risk of much harm from non-consensual
dissemination of the information that an individual is inflicted with
AIDS. 57
Additionally, in Doe v. Chand, 58 a patient sued his doctor for
violating the local AIDS Confidentiality Act (ACA) after the
doctor disclosed his AIDS status to fellow employees. The Chand
court determined that the ACA was enacted because “the
legislature . . . recognized the social stigma that attaches” to
individuals known to be infected with HIV, who “are pariahs,
55

See, e.g., Peter A. Vanable et al., Impact of HIV-related Stigma on Health
Behaviors and Psychological Adjustment Among HIV-positive Men and Women,
10 AIDS & BEHAV. 473 (2006).
56
72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995).
57
Id. at 1140.
58
781 N.E.2d 340.
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treated only slightly better than how people used to treat a leper
who escaped from the colony.” 59
With the rise of social media and communications technology,
an HIV-positive individual has a greater interest in protecting his
or her private medical status. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that highly sensitive employee information, including
HIV status, within an employee’s medical records necessitates
notice prior to disclosure to enable an HIV-positive employee to
raise a personal privacy claim. 60 Publicly announcing an
individual’s HIV status jeopardizes an infected individual’s ability
to obtain new employment, effective medical treatment and
insurance, and serve in a public capacity.
Adding physical insult to criminal injury, HIV stigmatization
has serious ramifications for an infected individual’s mental and
physical health. A 2006 study found that higher levels of HIV
stigma directly correlated with symptoms of depression and/or
psychiatric care. 61 The noted stigma was linked to delays by HIVpositive individuals in seeking medical care, confirming a
relationship between stigma and treatment mismanagement.
Ultimately, disparately overbroad criminal penalties and the
absence of mitigating factors informed by contemporary HIV
medical treatment should motivate employers and state legislatures
to reassess the alleged risks associated with HIV exposure. One
such benchmark would be ADA standards for characteristics
posing a direct threat to service and workplace conduct. A direct
threat to employer and employee safety is what the legislature was
actually concerned about when it enacted the criminal HIV
exposure statutes. Both the criminal law and direct threat
classification invoke preventative action: identifying a direct threat
enables an employer to justify selective hiring, and punishing HIV
exposure enables the legislature to preserve public health and
safety.
Since a direct threat must pose a significant risk to health and
safety that cannot be modified by treatment or preventative
measures, the use of ART, consistent undetectable viral loads, and
59

Id. at 352.
United States. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (1980).
61
Vanable, supra note 54, at, 476-77.
60
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sanitary precautions would allow for declassification of HIV
infection as a direct threat. 62 The availability of these same
measures also undermines criminalizing HIV exposure. When per
se exposure poses little to no risk of HIV transmission, employers
and employees have effectively prevented HIV transmission.
VIII. CRIMINAL HIV EXPOSURE LAWS UNDERMINE
RESPONSIBLE HIV TREATMENT
As Stark and Whitfield demonstrate, courts impose criminal
liability for HIV exposure, without regard for actual or potential
HIV transmission risks. The Stark and Whitfield courts required the
State to demonstrate three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to
prosecute HIV exposure; the defendant must know he or she is
HIV positive, intend to engage in an act theoretically capable of
exposing another to HIV, and perform the theoretical exposure
act. 63 Mitigating factors such as actual transmission risks
determined by an undetectable viral load, consent, disclosure, or
precautionary safety measures are glaringly absent from this
burden of proof.
Yet, contemporary medical treatment and scientific advances
have lessened the need for per se HIV exposure. Deterrence, a
criminal jurisprudence theory that prioritizes criminal punishment
as a means of inducing compliance with the law, relies upon the
assumption that HIV-positive individuals are aware of both the
criminal exposure law, as well as the type of behavior falling
within the scope of criminal liability. For the law to deter criminal
conduct, an HIV positive actor must know exactly what conduct is
illegal. A person must know what conduct exposes another to HIV
given effective safety precautions, an undetectable viral load, or
knowing consent.
Similarly, the success of incapacitating HIV-positive
individuals for HIV exposure depends upon the extent to which
law enforcement agents can identify people likely to expose and,
thus, infect others. The likelihood of infecting members of general
62
63

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3), (9) (2009).
See Stark, 66 Wash. App. at 424; Whitfield, 132 Wash. App. at 896.
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society must also be offset by how significantly the transmission
risk is redirected into prisons.
The aggregate impact of these shortcomings of criminal HIV
exposure laws is that many HIV-positive individuals face criminal
punishment despite the fact that it is nearly impossible for them to
actually transmit HIV. Continuing to punish per se exposure
despite responsible ART treatment perpetuates societal
misinformation regarding HIV exposure risk by conflating
theoretical exposure with subjective, individualized exposure risk
as mitigated by proper medical treatment and safety precautions.
Moreover, the overinclusive “exposure” language found in the
majority of criminal exposure laws fails to provide notice to HIVpositive individuals who regularly receive effective medical
treatment and are frequently informed by physicians as being
unable to transmit HIV in exposure moments.
HIV exposure laws thus maintain narrow mentes reae (intent to
engage in conduct theoretically capable of HIV exposure) but
overbroad actus rei, without a limiting principle to discern
theoretical harm from actual potential harm.
CONCLUSION
Although adapting state law to every medical advancement is
impractical, HIV treatment has evolved for nearly three decades.
Today, infected individuals may receive treatment capable of
suspending HIV growth, thereby limiting the number of infected
cells and reducing infection risks in exposure-prone situations.
Yet, HIV-positive individuals undergoing responsible and effective
treatment continue to be criminally liable at any and every
exposure-prone situation, regardless of viral load counts,
precautionary measures, or even consent. Ultimately, the
criminalization of HIV exposure necessitates statutory reform
capable of shielding responsible HIV-positive individuals from per
se criminal liability.
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Criminal defense lawyers, particularly public defenders,
should utilize up-to-date HIV treatment research to present
the most holistic and informed defense for clients charged
under state exposure laws.



Legislative advocates can provide local lawmakers with
current HIV treatment research about antiretroviral therapy
and reduced transmission risks, assist community health
clinics in acquiring government funding for low-income
HIV treatment, and suggest revisions to state exposure laws
that minimize bright-line exposure penalties.

